4.30
Times May 78. 1898.
THE OCCUPATION OF WEI-HAI-WEI.
The RARE of KIMBERLEY rose to ask her i Majesty's Government what were their inten-: tions as to the occupation of Wei-hai-wei. He said,
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I think the noble marquis will not be surprised that I have placed on the paper the notice about Wei-hai- wei. There is, no doubt, considerable anxiety as to what her Majesty's Government intend to do with regard to the occupation of that port. It seems to me that the occupation must be regarded in two aspects; Brat, to a considerable extent from the professional aspect of what the precise advantages of the port may be in a naval point of view, and what should be done to make it available for that purpose; and, second, the occupation from the point of view of the policy of this country with regard to the Far East, and on what that policy is based. As regards the airantages of the port from a naval point of view, I am, of course, not com- petent to express an opinion. All I can say is that having read with great attention a variety of opinions expressed on the subject I remain no wiser than I was before. Opinious differ very much as to its probable utility:
but I conclude this is a point which the Government must have carefully considered--namely, whether it would be necessary to fortify the port and to garrison it with British or Indian troops; and also whether or not it must be regarded as a secund bass to Bong-kong. Although I am no expert I have MATAL considerable doubts whether the advantages are great as some people represent them to be. At all events, it seems to be clear that any advantage which may be derived from the naval point of view must be restricted to the particular quarter of China which adjoins the Gulf of Pe-cbi-li. Apart from these ques- tions, which are certainly not without their importance. unless considerable strategic advantage is obtained it will entail
very great burden on this comtry to keep a large garrison at Wei-hai-wei; nor would it be master of indifference if you attempt to make it a large fortified port, for in that case it would require considerable expenditure of money. If, however, it is really of first-rate importance as a naval base, no one in this country will grudge the expenditure which may be necessary for that purpose. policy counseted with Wei-hai-wei, I feel considerable With regard to the doubt from the utterances which we have heard on the subject and from the papers laid before Parliament. The noble marquis, I think in February last, said in one of the despatches addressed to aur Minister at Peking that the interests of this country and Russia were not antagonistic. The subsequent proceedings of the Government seem to be based ou a different view, because it appeared that it was the occupation of Port Arthur by the Russians which in their view sec our occupation of Woi-hai-wei,
Decessitated One of the par the noble marquis was that the occupation of Port the remarks of Arthur by Kassia was a mistake on the part of Russia, or at all events it was balanced by our orcopation of Wei-hai-wei, That, I must say, rather perplexed me, and I was also unable to understand from the first how it was that the Government did not perceive that if Russia was to extend her dominion to Manchuria it was absolutely certain that the ice-free port which she passessed in Manchuris would be occupied as a naval base. It was clear to every one that Russia would not occupy Manchuria merely for the purpose of having a commercial port. I am unable to under- stand why her Majesty's Government did not base their polisy, whatever it might have been, on the knowledge that in all probability the naval base to be selected by Russia in that quarter of the world would be Port Arthur. I suppose it is not unfair to assume that our occupation of Wei-hai-wei is an answer to the occups- Russia of Port Arthur. Now what does that imply P
It implies clearly a antagoniam to Russia in that quarter of the world. If policy of direct we are to place ourselves in that position of direct autagonism, it is necessary to consider how far Wei- hai-wei would be of avail in enabling us to maintain that position. I am argning on the supposition, which I think is the only one which can be derived from the ourse recently pursued by the Government in the occupation of Wei-hai-wei, that the antagonistic posi- tion to Russia
in that quarter of the regarded by them as
world is inevitable. this is perfectly clear, and the Government have 1 think that throughout, I think, the later stages of these pro- ceedings clearly perceived it-namely, that the power of Russia in the Far East after changes which have taken place is a power which these remarkable is derived from Russia has completed
bez position by land. When
her Siberian railway, tDat section of the railway
and down to the open sea in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, her which brings her military power in that quarter of the world will be enormously increased. Although we have been taught by the celebrated work of Captain Maban that ses power has a considerable effect even with regard to the opera- tions of another Power by land, I cannot conceive that the possession of Wei-hai-Wei, when Russia occupies Manchuria with a very large military force, can enable us auccessfully by
that vance of Russia in the direction of Peking. There- means to resist the ad- fore. I do not hai-wei will be
that the occupation of Wei- advantage this country.
see
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do not pass over what I think is pointed out by the noble marquis-namely, the temporary of Wei-hai-wei.
advantage to us that has taken place
After #31 I can conceive the Government influence at Peking would be seriously diminished that their unless some method was
the
and that for a time the messure of cecupping Wei-hai- adopted to maintain a jt. wei might assist us in maintaining our position diplo matically
at Peking. But I desire rather to consider Occupation of Wei-hai-wei from the point of view of permanent advantage to this country, and what policy and Far East. We have had some remarkable atterances on temporary advantage are implied by it in the this subject, The noble marquis in addressing the Prim- rose League recently said: As long as the Chinese Empire remains upright I do not think that that power (the power of Russia by land) can be exercised even if Kassia desires to exercise it which I am asserting to the injury of the rest of the world." Tast reoms China is not opricht le prostrate, i
that China is upri
and
to ARUIDO
Do means
10774/9.
myseit at present see by what means she is to be raised to such a position of restored power as to enable her successfully to resist the pressure of her powerful neighbour to the north. I am not the only person who takes that view. I suppose most of us have been-I not say startled but immensely interested in a speech which was made by a distinguished colleague of
will
the noble margnis day or two ago. There are many
things in that speech which have no connexion with the subject-matter
a now bringing forward, but I and there a
De reference to our position in China, In the i first
observe that, far from admitting China is upright, Mr. Chamberisin says that the Government wers not altogether prepared for the total collapse of Chius, and be
goes ou to say From the moment that you recognized that fact you bad to see that China, unless she were assisted from outside, is absolutely at the mercy of the great military empire with its hundred million inhabitants and its 4,000 miles of land frontier on the boundary of China. That declaration is not consistent with the view of the noble marquis that China is upright. That to say, as long as China is upright there is no danger from Russia Chamberlain's view is correct and I must say I agree but if Mr. with him-China is in such a
that she is condition unable to hold her ground against her great neighbone without assistance from without, possession of Wei-hai-wei give us
Now, the power of effectively assisting her from without if ever-I do not wish to anticipate-Russia should take measures to march southwards and perhaps occupy Peking ? seems to me that is an impossible proposition. It is 10 quite impossible to conceive that the mere poszecsion of Wei-hai-wei would enable us to resist such an advance if it were really undertaken. Well, then,
it may naturally be said with Mr. Chamberlain, because he made an allusion to the position of affairs when we were in office, Did we foresee the position in which China would be placed by the collapse after the war with Japan, and did we take any measures to prevent the consequences which might follow from that collapse ? Now, my lords, I will be quite explicit. We were per- fectly alive to the enormous change which must neces sarily follow from the collapse of China in consequence of her defeat by Japan, and we had to consider whether or not we should join with the three other Powers Russia, Germany, and France--who invited us to join in the measures which they took to compel Japan to relin- quish possession of Port Arthur. that that step on the part of those three Powers would Knowing as we did have considerable after-results, we came to the cou- clusion, nevertheless, first, that we were not justified in interfering, as regards the war in which we
taken
moe
no part, with the victorious Power; and, secondly, we
we had were of opinion, looking to the great change impending in the Far East, that there was nothing more important to this country than to establish with the growing naval Power of Japan. (Cheers.) A a friendly relation naval Power will always be of more eonsequence as a friend to this country in that quarter of the world than any other Power, and I believe that a seriously mistaken policy could not have been pro- moted than to have joined the other Powers in that action against Japan and thereby alienating her from this country. My lords, it has been asked by Mr. Chamberlain, What did we do? Why did we take no steps, to come to # Russia How was it possible diplomatically in the timely understanding with circumstances in which we were placed f The Treaty of Shimonoseki was not signed till the middle of April, and the late Government, of which I was a member, was turned out of office in June. I think that anybody will see that between April and Jane it would have been impossible for us to establish a fresh understanding with Russia. Far be it from me to say that such an understanding would not be desirable; on the contrary, I think it would be of great advantage; but I do say Mr. Chamberlain is answered simply by this, that the position we were in, whatever we might have intended or thought, impossible.
rendered such an understanding abdulge in any tu
1
am not in the least disposed to quoque, but still, when this is thrown in our teeth, I can- Bot help remarking that if such an understanding was desirable and possible her Majesty's present Govern- ment have had two and a-half years in which to consider it. So much for that matter. To return to the question
of policy connected with Wei-hai-wei and the Far East generally, I must again refer to Mr. Chamberlain's speech, because he bases the greater part of his rather remarkable utterance upon the position of affairs in Chins. Towards the close of his speech be laid it down very strongly that our position there is one which must necessarily place us in some difficulty on account of the change of situation, and the conclusion, apparently, at which he arrived was that such was the position and such was the pressure upon na that the time had arrived when we were to make a vast change in our diplomatic attitude change which would affect, not only our attitude in China--for it could not be confined to China bat throughout the world, and that we were to abandon the principle upon which years acted with regard to our foreign affairs, of not we have for many engaging in what are commonly called alliances, but, on the contrary, that it was our duty to eatangling seek other alliances, Now, by these alliances can only he meant alliances for mutual defenen. No others can possibly be pointed at. Now, alliances for mutual defence of coarse
imply taking a antagonism against somebody. An alliance of that nature position of in the Far East must mean an alliance against Russia. I am by no means saying that we vaght to keep out of view the great and growing power of Russia, but when I am told that the moment has come and a warning requires to be given to the nation that the policy pursued for so many years is to be chan ask myself are to seek for alliances elsewhere,
and we whether this is the moment, whether the moment has arrived, when so great a change is to be sought to be brought into effect, and I ask myself this also can it be (of course am not in the secrets of the Govern- ment) that her Majesty's Government have so far ad- vanced in that direction bear of
that ere long we may the conelusion of some with a powerful European natiou? For, although
great
alliance I value as much as auy man
standing and close friendship with the United States, a good under- yet I cannot conceive of an alliance of that kind with the United States, because it is contrary to all policy which the United States has hitherto pursund. The alliance, therefore. Innst ha aught sisewhere; it must
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